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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken from a summary judgment certified under
Rule

54(b)

by

the

Fifth

District

Court,

James

L.

Shumate,

presiding, as a final judgment on all issues and all claims between
the plaintiffs and Stewart Title Guaranty Company
Jurisdiction

lies

in

this

Court

pursuant

to

("Stewart").

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 78-2a-3 (2) (j) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented by this appeal:
1.

What is the extent of vicarious liability imposed by Utah

Code Ann. § 31A-23-308 on a title insurance company
of

its agent?

Specifically,

in the

instant

for the acts

case, is Stewart

vicariously liable under § 31A-23-308 for First Title's failure to
warn plaintiffs of possible improprieties by plaintiffs' partner,
Vernon George?
This issue was raised by the twenty-third cause of action in
plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and was addressed in Stewart's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.

[R. 610;

297; R. 585.]

Mountain

The standard of review is for correctness.

States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d

184

(Utah

1991).
2.

To what extent is a title insurance company liable at

common law for the acts of its limited agent which are unrelated to
the issuance of title insurance policies?

286598 1
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Specifically, in the

instant case, is Stewart vicariously liable at common law for the
acts of First Title in the escrows, settlements and closings at
issue?
This issue was raised by the twenty-third cause of action in
plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and was addressed in Stewart's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 610; R.
297; R. 585.]

The standard of review is for correctness.

States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d

Mountain
184

(Utah

1991) .
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-23-3 08 and 31A-23-3 05 are determinative
on this appeal.

These statutory provisions are set forth in the

addendum to this brief, Exhibit 1.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This case arises from disputes among partners in two real
estate development companies over the purchase and sale of real
estate located in southwestern Utah.

The transactions involved

several projects that were either purchased or sold beginning in
June, 1992 and ending during the summer of 1993.

Most of the

escrow closings and issuance of title policies were handled by
First Title of Utah, Inc. ("First Title").
Instead of bringing claims only against their partner in the
development companies who allegedly defrauded them, plaintiffs sued
nearly everyone who ever had anything to do with the projects in

286598 1
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which the plaintiffs were involved, including Stewart.

Stewart's

only connection was that its title insurance policies were issued
to the development companies on their projects closed through First
Title.
Stewart moved the court for summary judgment in June of 1996.
[R. 280.]

The motion was argued before the Fifth District Court,

Honorable James L. Shumate presiding,

in August, 1996.

Shumate

summary

granted

Stewart's

motion

for

judgment

Judge
on

the

grounds that Stewart, as a matter of law, was not liable to the
plaintiffs under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-305 or 308 or under a
common law agency theory of liability.

Judge Shumate certified the

judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and plaintiffs appealed.

[R. 656.]

STATEMENT OF FACTS1

'
1.
company.
limited

Stewart

Title Guaranty

Company

is a title

insurance

First Title of Utah, Inc. is Stewart's agent for the
purpose

commitments.

of

issuing

title

insurance

policies

and

First Title's authority to act as an agent on behalf

of Stewart is governed by a document entitled "Amendment to Title
Insurance

Underwriting

Agreement")

Agreement"

dated

July

1,

1984

("Agency

executed by Stewart, as principal underwriter, and

Plaintiffs did not rely on any disputed material facts in
responding to Stewart's motion for summary judgment nor do
plaintiffs claim the existence of any disputed material facts in
their appellate brief.
286598 1
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First

Title, as agent.

[Arlen Taylor

attached Exhibit A; R. 283.]

affidavit

11 5,

6 and

The Agency Agreement provides:

In consideration of the mutual agreements
expressed
herein,
UNDERWRITER
[Stewart]
appoints COMPANY [First Title] as its agent to
execute
title policies
in the name of
UNDERWRITER
with
the authority,
duties,
limitations and conditions set forth in this
Agreement.
Title policies, as the term is
used in this Agreement, shall include all
contracts of title insurance or guaranty,
including
title
insurance
policies,
endorsements, binders and commitments.
[Taylor affidavit, Exhibit A, R. 283.]

First Title is expressly

forbidden by the Agency Agreement to represent itself as an agent
for Stewart in the escrow business:
Although
Company may conduct
an escrow
business, Company shall not represent to the
public that it is an agent of Underwriter in
the conduct of the escrow business.
[Taylor affidavit 11 4, 8 and attached Exhibit A, 1 8, R. 283.]
Under

the Agency

Agreement,

Stewart

is only

entitled

generated by First Title's issuance of Stewart title

to

fees

insurance

policies and is not entitled to any fees generated by First Title's
escrow,

settlement

or

closing

activities.

[Taylor

affidavit,

Exhibit A, 1 11, R. 283 .]
2.
Rosemont

In February of 1992, Vernon George
Corporation

("Rosemont")

purchase the Fly-In L D Ranch
("Drews").
California

entered

("George") and The
into

option

(the "Ranch") from Angela

[Second Amended Complaint, 1 8, R.610.]
corporation

an

allegedly

under

to

Drews

Rosemont is a

the control

of George.

[Second Amended Complaint, 1 1, R. 610.] The purchase price of the
286598 1
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Ranch

under

the

option

was

$1.6

million.

[Second

Amended

Complaint, f 8, R. 610] . George paid Drews $10,000 for the option
to purchase

the Ranch on February

17, 1992.

deposition at 30, 31 and Exhibit 3.]

[Michael Bodell

On February 22, 1992, an

addendum to the Ranch purchase option was executed which stated
that the purchase price for the Ranch would be $1.8 million and
that Rosemont would receive a commission of $250,000 upon
closing of the Ranch sale.

the

[Michael Bodell deposition, Exhibit 7.]

On April 22, 1992, George paid an additional $35,000 to Drews to
lease the Ranch from April 30, 1992, until August 22, 1992, or
until the date that the February purchase option was terminated,
whichever came first.
6.]

[Michael Bodell deposition at 31 and Exhibit

Both the $10,000 option payment and the $35,000 lease payment

were to be applied to the purchase price of the Ranch.
Bodell deposition at 30, 31 and Exhibit 4.]

[Michael

On June 3, 1992,

George assigned Rosemont's commission on the Ranch sale "toward the
Purchase Price" of the Ranch

[Robert Elliott deposition at 23-24

and Exhibit 43; Michael Bodell deposition at 34 ]
3.

Around March of 1992, the individual plaintiffs, James

Bodell and Michael Bodell, were introduced to George by Floyd I
Helm ("Helm") . Helm is a realtor licensed by the State of Utah and
is an agent of The Property Shoppe, Inc , a Utah corporation

Helm

told the plaintiffs that George was "looking for a partner" to
participate in George's purchase of the Ranch.
Complaint, 1 9, R

286598 1

610 ]

5

[Second Amended

4.

George advised Michael Bodell, one of the plaintiffs,

that the lowest price the Ranch could be purchased for was $1.8
million.

[Second Amended Complaint, 1 10, R. 610.]

On June 8,

1992, the Ranch was sold for $1.8 million to Cedar Creek Ranch,
L.C.

("Cedar Creek").

[Second Amended Complaint, 1 49, R. 610.]

Cedar Creek was a development company formed by plaintiffs and
[Second Amended Complaint, % 49, R. 610.]

George.
5.

At the closing of the Ranch sale, which was handled by

First Title, plaintiffs contributed $377,700 in cash to the Ranch
purchase.

George,

in

turn,

$100,000 with First Title.

deposited
First

a

Title

cashier's

check

also received

for

a wire

transfer of $288,000 from an entity called Melrose Escrow for the
Ranch

purchase.

[Michael

Bodell

deposition

at

29-35

and

Exhibits 49, 52.] Melrose Escrow is an entity allegedly affiliated
with George.

[Michael Bodell deposition at 32, 33.]

indicated

above,

commission

to the purchase of the Ranch.

deposited

with

George

First

Title

had

previously

for Rosemont's

Amended Complaint, H 15, R. 610.]

applied

Finally, as
Rosemont's

No funds were ever
commission.

[Second

First Title did not disburse any

funds to Rosemont or George in connection with Rosemont's sales
commission on the Ranch.

Rather, the commission appeared on Cedar

Creek's buyer's closing statement as part of a "credit" to Cedar
Creek, along with the $45,000 George had previously paid to Drews
for the purchase option and to lease the Ranch.

286598 1
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[Robert Elliott

deposition at 23-24 and Exhibits 43, 46; Second Amended Complaint
13, R. 610.]
6.

Subsequent to the acquisition of the Ranch, Cedar Creek

undertook to develop and market lots in the Ranch.

Before sales of

lots could be made, Cedar Creek was required by the State of Utah
to establish an escrow for on-site improvements (the "Improvement
Escrow").

[Second

Improvement

Amended

Escrow was

Complaint,

R.

at

First

to be established

capital contributed by George.
R. 610.]

f 50,

610.]

The

Title

from

[Second Amended Complaint, f 51,

First Title's obligation with respect to the Improvement

Escrow was to disburse funds deposited by George in the Improvement
Escrow

to

third

parties

who

made

improvements

on

the

Ranch.

[Robert Elliott deposition at 56, 57 and Exhibits 54-56.]

George

gave personal checks to First Title for the Improvement Escrow but
these checks bounced when deposited by First Title.

[First Title

Answer, % 52, R. 95; Kathryn Elliott deposition at 38, 40.]
result, George ultimately never funded the
[Second Amended Complaint, % 55, R. 610.]

Improvement

As a

Escrow.

Although a title policy

was issued on the purchase of the ranch, and on the later sales of
various

ranch

lots,

no

policy

or

commitment

was

issued

in

connection with the Ranch Improvement Escrow.
7.

Plaintiffs also claim to have been defrauded by George in

a transaction involving a parcel of property in what is referred to
as the East Ridge project.
parcels

286598 1

in

the East

[Pltfs.' Brief at 17.]

Ridge project, First

7

Title

On one of the
conducted

two

closings on July 27, 1993.

% 127,

[Second Amended Complaint,

R. 610.] In the first closing, the purchaser was River Road, L.C.
("River Road") and the purchase price was $75,000.00.
Amended

Complaint,

Exhibit 88.]
of George.

U

131, R. 610; Michael

Bodell

[Second

deposition,

River Road is a company allegedly under the control
[Pltfs.' Brief at 14.]

River Road paid $28.36 toward

this purchase and the remaining balance, together with fees owed to
First Title, was due to the seller.
Exhibit 88.]

[Michael Bodell deposition,

In the second closing, River Road sold the parcel to

Clear Creek Development, L.C. ("Clear Creek") and the purchase
price was $90,000.00.
Clear Creek
George.
A

is a development

company

formed by plaintiffs and

In this second closing, the plaintiffs paid $75,061.64.

$15,000

credit

purchase price.
credit

[Michael Bodell deposition, Exhibit 90.]

was given to Clear Creek

the $90,000

[Second Amended Complaint f 131, R. 610.]

was characterized

seller.

toward

as a

"down payment"

received

This

by the

[Michael Bodell deposition, Exhibit 90.] On July 1, 19937

George had earlier given River Road a $15,000 earnest money deposit
on

the

parcel.

[Michael

Bodell

deposition,

Exhibit

Plaintiffs claim to have been injured because this
allegedly created
project.
8.

91.]

transaction

"phantom equity" for George in the Eastridge

[Second Amended Complaint 1JH 128, 129, R. 610.]
Finally, in January, 1993, George and Bodell agreed to

purchase an approved but uncompleted subdivision in St. George,
Utah

286598 1

("Lava Pointe") for development purposes through a limited

8

liability company.
R. 610].

[Second Amended

Complaint, UK 72, 74, 75,

In May, 1993, George and Bodell agreed to purchase a

second part of Lava Pointe

(Lava Pointe II) .

[Second Amended

Complaint, % 81, R. 610] . The sales agent for both the Lava Pointe
and Lava Pointe II purchases was a company known as Rredco Realty.
[Second Amended Complaint, K 82, R. 610.]

At the closing of Lava

Pointe II, pursuant to instructions from Rredco Realty, First Title
paid part of Rredco Realty's sales commission to third parties.
[Second Amended Complaint, f 91, R. 610; Robert Elliott deposition
at 78-80, 86, 88, 89.]

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Rredco

Realty was entitled to the commission.

Plaintiffs claim only that

Rredco should not have paid a portion of the commission to third
parties who plaintiffs allege are creditors of George, and that
First Title should not have followed Rredco's instruction to do so.
9.

Stewart never made any representations to plaintiffs that

First Title was Stewart's agent for escrow, closing or settlement
business.

During

plaintiffs never had

all

of

the

above-mentioned

any contact with Stewart

transactions,

whatsoever,

and

particularly never contacted Stewart to find out what authority
First Title had to conduct business on behalf of Stewart:

286598 1

Q.

Okay.
Have you ever talked to anyone at Stewart
Title.

A.

No.

Q.

Related to these transactions?

A.

No.

9

Q.

Have you ever corresponded with anyone at Stewart Title
related to these transactions?

A.

No.

[Michael Bodell deposition at 367-368.]
10.

Stewart's only involvement in the above transactions was

to underwrite the title insurance policies issued by First Title in
its capacity as Stewart's limited agent.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Stewart is not liable, as a matter of law, under § 31A-23-308,
§ 31A-23-305, or under a common law theory of agency liability.
Section

31A-23-308 makes

title

companies

liable only

for

"the

receipt and disbursement of funds deposited in escrows, closings or
settlements with the title insurance agents . . . . "

The funds

received and/or disbursed by First Title in the transactions at
issue were not misallocated, misdirected, embezzled or otherwise
dealt with improperly by First Title.
disbursed
settlements

funds
and

exactly

as

closings.

First Title received and

directed

in

the

Because

First

various

Title

escrows,

received

and

disbursed funds as directed by the parties to the transactions,
Stewart is not vicariously liable under § 31A-23-308 as a matter of
law.
Likewise, Stewart is not liable under § 31A-23-305 or a common
law agency theory of liability.

The scope of First Title's agency

authority, as defined by its underwriting agreement with Stewart,
was

specifically

policies.
286598 1

limited

Plaintiffs'

to

issuing

claims

against
10

Stewart
Stewart

title

insurance

for

vicarious

liability

arise

out

of

the

escrow,

settlement

or

closing

transactions handled by First Title, and not out of First Title's
issuance

of

Stewart

title

insurance

policies.

Consequently,

Stewart is not liable, as a matter of law, under § 31A-23-305 or a
common law agency theory of liability.
ARGUMENT
I.

STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY IS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-23-308 BECAUSE FIRST TITLE'S ALLEGED
MISCONDUCT DOES NOT ARISE FROM THE "RECEIPT AND DISBURSEMENT
OF FUNDS DEPOSITED IN ESCROWS, CLOSINGS, OR SETTLEMENTS" WITH
FIRST TITLE AS REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE.
Stewart is not liable to plaintiffs, as a matter of law, for

the alleged misconduct of First Title under § 31A-23-308.

Section

31A-23-308 of the Utah Code provides that:
Any title company, represented by one or more title
insurance agents, is directly and primarily liable
to others dealing with the title insurance agents
for the receipt and disbursement of funds deposited
in escrows, closings, or settlements with the title
insurance agents in all those transactions where a
commitment or binder for or policy or contract of
title insurance of that title insurance company has
been ordered, or a preliminary report of the title
insurance company has been issued or distributed.
This liability does not modify, mitigate, impair,
or affect the contractual obligations between the
title insurance agents and the title insurance
company.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308

(1996) .

Resolution of plaintiffs'

claims under this statute turns on proper statutory analysis. When
interpreting a Utah statute, a court should first look to the plain
language of the statute. Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt
Lake County, 913 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1995); State v. Larsen, 865
P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993).
286598 1
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Plaintiffs contend that

§ 31A-23-308

imposes

liability on

title insurance companies "for the escrow, settlement and closing
services" of their agents.

[Pltfs.' Brief at 27.]

argument ignores the plain language of the statute.

Plaintiffs'
Even assuming

that § 31A-23-308 applies to title insurance companies such as
Stewart,2 nothing in the statute states that a title
company is liable for all acts of its limited agent.

insurance

Rather, the

statute makes title insurance companies liable, if at all, only for
their

agent's

receipt

and

disbursement

of

funds

deposited

in

escrow, closing and settlement transactions.
First Title did exactly as instructed with all funds deposited
with it.

Plaintiffs have not alleged, and there is no evidence,

that First Title embezzled or misallocated funds or engaged in any
other improper conduct in receiving and disbursing funds deposited
in the escrows, closings, or settlements
appellate

brief,

plaintiffs

identify

at

five

issue.
acts

In their
of

alleged

"wrongdoing" by First Title for which plaintiffs claim Stewart
should be held vicariously liable under § 31A-23-308.

2

None of

The plain language of § 31A-23-308 indicates that § 31A-23308 only applies to "title companies." While the issue was not
raised at the trial court hearing on Stewart's motion for summary
judgment, Stewart has denied that it is a title company within the
meaning of § 31A-23-308. [Stewart Answer to Complaint 1 5, R. 80.]
Title companies, such as First Title, commonly provide escrow,
settlement and closing services, and also frequently conduct title
searches, prepare title insurance commitments and issue title
insurance policies on the behalf of title insurance companies.
Title insurance companies underwrite the title insurance policies
issued by title companies. Stewart is a title insurance company,
not a title company. Section 31A-23-308 on its face, therefore,
does not apply to Stewart.
286598 1
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these acts involves receipt or disbursement of funds deposited in
escrow with First Title.
First,

plaintiffs

claim

that

First

Title

issued

a

title

insurance policy on the Fly-In LD Ranch for $ 1.6 million instead
of $1.8 million.
not

involve

[Pltfs.' Brief at 17.]

receipt

or

disbursement

This claim obviously does
of

funds.

Furthermore,

plaintiffs do not claim that this violated any contract, breached
any duty, or caused any harm to plaintiffs.
Second, plaintiffs claim to have been injured in the Fly-In LD
Ranch

purchase

because

George,

through

"kickback commission" on the Ranch sale.

Rosemont, was
Id.3

given

a

This commission

does not implicate First Title's receipt or disbursement of funds
deposited with it in escrow.

As indicated above, pursuant to an

agreement with the seller, George, through Rosemont, was given a
$250,000 commission on the Ranch sale.
Ranch,

however,

George

assigned

Purchase Price" of the Ranch.

this

Before the closing on the
commission

"toward

the

First Title did not receive any

money in escrow or at the closing of the Ranch sale for payment of
Rosemont's commission.
payment

No money was disbursed

of the commission.

to Rosemont

as

Rather, the commission was merely

3

Plaintiffs claim that First Title manipulated closing
statements to "mask" George's commission on the Ranch sale. The
closing statement that plaintiffs claim to have discovered
subsequent to the trial court's granting Stewart's motion for
summary judgment, however, does in fact disclose that $250,000 was
being credited to Cedar Creek's purchase of the Ranch as a
"Commission credited to Buyer [Cedar Creek] at closing." [Pltfs.'
Brief, Exhibit 2.]
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credited to Cedar Creek by the seller at the Ranch sale closing.
Plaintiffs do not claim, and there simply is no evidence, that
First Title misallocated, misdirected, embezzled or otherwise dealt
improperly with any of the funds it actually received or disbursed
in the Ranch sale closing.
Third, plaintiffs claim that First Title conducted a "double
escrow" on one of
resulted

in

the parcels at the Eastridge project

plaintiffs

[Pltfs.' Brief at 17.]

paying

an

"inflated

purchase

which

price."

As indicated above, the alleged "double

escrow" merely involved two closings on a parcel at the Eastridge
project.

In one closing, an entity controlled by George, River

Road, purchased the parcel for $75,000.

In the second closing,

Clear Creek, a development company formed by plaintiffs and George,
purchased

the

$75,061.54

to the purchase

closing.

parcel

for

$90,000.

Plaintiffs

price of the parcel

contributed

in the

second

A down payment credit was given to Clear Creek by River

Road in the closing in the amount of $15,000.

George had earlier

placed a $15,000 earnest money deposit with River Road on the
parcel on July 1, 1993.

Similar to the credit given Cedar Creek in

the Ranch closing, no funds were deposited with First Title to
establish this credit on behalf of Clear Creek. Again, plaintiffs'
claims for injury rest on George's allegedly creating
equity" for himself in the project.

"phantom

Plaintiffs do not claim, and

there is no evidence, that any funds actually deposited with First
Title were received or disbursed improperly.
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Fourth, plaintiffs claim that First Title represented to the
State of Utah and to buyers of lots in the Ranch that a cash
improvement escrow was in place "when, in fact, the escrow funds
were never collected."

[Pltfs.' Brief at 17.]

Even assuming that

these allegations are true,4 this does not constitute misconduct
in

receiving

or disbursing

funds

deposited

with

First

Title.

George assumed the obligation of funding the Improvement Escrow on
behalf of Cedar Creek.

First Title's duty, as escrow agent, was to

disburse any funds received from George to third parties that made
improvements on the Ranch.

The checks George gave to First Title

were never cleared by the bank on whose account they were drawn.
Consequently, First Title never received any funds from George to
be deposited in the Improvement Escrow under § 31A-23-308 and,
therefore, First Title did not disburse any funds and could not
have misallocated, misdirected

or embezzled

any such funds as

required to impose vicarious liability on Stewart under § 31A-23308.

Furthermore, no title policies or commitments were issued

specifically in connection with the Ranch Improvement Escrow, a
necessary condition for liability under § 31A-23-308.
Finally, plaintiffs claim that First Title improperly paid
part of Rredco Realty's sales commission on the Lava Pointe II
closing to third parties.
acknowledge,

however,

[Pltfs.' Brief at 17.]

this

was

4

done

pursuant

As plaintiffs
to

specific

Plaintiffs'
record
citations
do
not
support
their
allegations. Nowhere in "R.396, Exhibits M , ' x 5'" and MR.555" is
there evidence that First Title made any such representations.
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instructions

from

Rredco

Complaint, 1 91, R. 610.]
not

entitled

to

the

Realty

("Rredco").

[Second

Amended

Plaintiffs do not claim that Rredco was

commissions.

Nothing

in

§

31A-23-308

prohibited Rredco from assigning part or all of its commission to
any party it desired.

First Title was instructed by Rredco how to

disburse Rredco's commission, and did so.

Consequently, First

Title cannot be said to have misdirected funds for the purposes of
§ 31A-23-308 in the Lava Pointe II closing.

Stewart is not liable

under § 31A-23-308, therefore, as a matter of law.5

5

The limited legislative history accompanying § 31A-23-308
likewise does not support plaintiffs' position. Section 31A-23-308
resulted from a general overhaul of Utah insurance legislation.
The task force committee that drafted the legislation presented the
bill to the legislature in a form that included commentary on each
proposed new section. The commentary to §31A-23-308 states that:
This section was taken in part from the Maryland
title
insurance code and
in part
from the
suggestions from the title insurance committee.
This section requires underwriters (title insurance
companies) to assume liability for all errors
and/or omissions arising from the title insurance
policies issued by their agents or by themselves in
the State of Utah. This section provides a
guarantee [sic] avenue of recourse for the consumer
of title insurance in the event that the title
insurance agent or the title search has not been
properly done.
[Stewart Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, Appendix, R.
297] (emphasis added) . While the language of § 308 as ultimately
enacted does not square with the legislature's stated purpose, it
is consistent with an intention to impose liability only for a very
specific type of loss. What may be more significant is that the
legislative history reveals no intention to make title insurance
companies vicariously liable for all acts of agents who issue title
policies, whether those acts are related to the issuance of title
policies or not.

286598 1

16

Plaintiffs do not claim that First Title mishandled
deposited with it.

funds

Rather, the essence of plaintiffs' claim under

§ 31A-23-308 is that First Title had a duty to be aware of and to
report

the

alleged

fraudulent

conduct

of

George, plaintiffs'

partner, in the real estate transactions that First Title handled,
and that Stewart may be held vicariously liable for First Title's
breach of this obligation.
above,

however,

§

[Pltfs.' Brief at 18.]

31A-23-308

makes

title

As demonstrated

insurance

companies

liable, if at all, only for their agent's misconduct in receiving
or disbursing funds that are deposited with the agent.
§

31A-23-308

expresses

an

intent

to

impose

a

duty

Nothing in
on

title

insurance agents or title insurance companies to warn a party to an
escrow, settlement or closing of fraudulent

conduct by another

party to the transaction.6

6

It is significant to note that First Title also did not have
a duty to disclose George's alleged fraudulent conduct at common
law. At common law, a title agent's duty, when acting as an escrow
agent, is merely to follow the instructions that the parties have
formulated in the escrow agreement Nelson v Ashton-Jenkins Co ,
66 Utah 351, 242 P 408 (1925) , Meyers v Rockford Svs. . Inc., 625
N.E 2d 916, 922 (111 Ct App 1993) (escrow agent has duty to act
only in accordance with escrow instructions).
Consequently, an
escrow agent is not responsible to inform or give notice to the
parties to an escrow of any issues or facts extraneous to the
escrow instructions Barr v Pratt, 804 P.2d 498, 498 (Ore 1991)
(escrow agent has "no obligation to either party to the transaction
except to carry out the terms of the escrow instructions"),
Gebravel v. Transamerica Title Ins Co., 888 P 2d 83, 88 (Ore. Ct.
App. 1995) (same)
In the instant case, plaintiffs have not
alleged that First Title failed to follow instructions m any
escrow agreement First Title administered. First Title faithfully
executed all the instructions in all the escrow agreements at issue
in this case.

(continued
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II.

PLAINTIFFS' UNJUSTIFIED AND UNDULY BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE

SCOPE OF LIABILITY IMPOSED BY § 31A-23 -308 IS NOT NECESSARY TO
PROVIDE PROTECTION TO CONSUMERS OF ESCROW, SETTLEMENT AND
CLOSING SERVICES SINCE ADEQUATE PROTECTIONS ARE ALREADY IN
PLACE.
Plaintiffs claim that § 31A-23-308 must be read to make title
insurance companies liable for any and all misconduct of title

6

(...continued)
Plaintiffs cite an Arizona case stating an exception to this
general rule that arises when a title insurance agent knows that a
fraud is being committed on a participant in an escrow. Contrary
to plaintiffs' assertions at the trial court, this exception is not
"widely recognized." See D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., LAW OF TITLE INSURANCE
§18.3.3 (2d ed. 1993) ("there is a tension in the case law between
cases imposing a duty to disclose known fraud on the agent, and
those emphasizing that an agent's duty is only to carry out the
escrow instructions"). Plaintiffs cite no Utah state court case
recognizing the exception. If anything, it appears that the Utah
Supreme Court would reject the exception.
In Friegard v. First Western National Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616
(Utah 1987) , the Utah Supreme Court relied on National Bank v.
Equity Investors, 506 P.2d 20 (Wash. 1973) in holding that escrow
agents owe fiduciary duties to their principals. In National Bank,
the court concluded that while an escrow agent owes fiduciary
duties to the escrow principals, these "duties and limitations are
defined. . . by his or her instructions." Furthermore, in Nelson
v. Ashton Jenkins Company, 242 P. 408 (Utah 1925) , the Utah Supreme
Court rejected a claim for the same type of "fraud" claimed by
plaintiffs in this case - - a n escrow agent's failure to inform the
purchaser of a parcel of property of a commission to be paid to a
party to the escrow. In Nelson, the plaintiff, a purchaser in a
real estate contract, brought suit against Ashton-Jenkins Company,
the escrow depository, and its agent Carlquist.
Carlquist also
acted as real estate broker in the transaction.
The plaintiff
claimed that the defendants were liable for failing to disclose an
agreement between Carlquist and the sellers by which the sellers
agreed to pay, and did pay, Carlquist any amount over $4000 that
they received from the transaction.
Carlquist had repeatedly
represented to the plaintiff that the seller was unwilling to lower
the purchase price below $4,700. In concluding that the defendants
were not liable for failing to disclose this commission agreement,
the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[t]he plaintiff received exactly
what she bought and paid for, and it therefore appears that the
Ashton-Jenkins Company discharged every obligation imposed upon it
by the terms of the escrow agreement." Id. at 410.
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companies in order to ensure that customers of title companies are
adequately protected.
companies

liable

The effect would be to make title insurance

as additional

carriers for title companies.
only

the plain

language

of

errors

and omissions

insurance

Plaintiffs' argument ignores not
the

statute, but

also

the

myriad

safeguards already provided to customers of escrow, settlement and
closing services by law.
The Utah Legislature has established clear protections for
consumers of escrow, settlement and closing services.

First, Utah

law requires that each title insurance agent post a $50,000 bond or
purchase an equivalent professional liability policy in order to
conduct escrow, settlement and closing services.

Utah Code Ann. §

31A-23-211 (1996) .
Second, all title insurance agents must maintain a reserve
fund for the exclusive purpose of settling claims arising from the
title insurance agent's improper performance in providing escrow,
settlement

or closing

services.

Id.

This reserve

fund must

constitute one percent of the title insurance agent's gross income
and must be maintained

for at least two years after the title

insurance agent ceases doing business.
Third, the
conduct

escrows,

law requires
settlements,

licensing requirements.

title
or

insurance
closings

agents that
to

meet

also

extensive

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-211 (4) , (6); §

31A-23-307(1) (1996) .

286598 1
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Fourth, the law also requires title insurance agents that
conduct escrow activities to deposit escrow funds in federally
insured

accounts.

Regardless

Utah

Code

of whether

these

Ann.

§

31A-23-307

provisions

are

(1996) .

sufficient

to

protect consumers of escrow, settlement and closing services to
plaintiffs' liking, it is a legislative function to determine the
amount of minimum protection that will be provided by the state.
Section

31A-23-308

limited extent.
protection

is an additional

By its plain

against

a title

protection

but

only

to a

language, § 31A-23-308 provides

insurance

agent's

absconding

with,

misappropriating or misdirecting funds received or disbursed by the
title insurance agent.

It does not, as plaintiffs contend, provide

protection against all misconduct of a title insurance agent in
providing escrow, settlement or closing services.

It is not the

function of courts to expand the coverage of a statute beyond its
plainly stated scope, as plaintiffs would have this Court do in
relation

to

§

31A-23-308,

in

order

to

framework constructed by the legislature.

alter

the

regulatory

State v. Maguire, 924

P.2d 904, 907 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (court "cannot by construction
liberalize the statute and enlarge its provisions" since " [w]hen
language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it
expresses,

and

no

room

is

left

for

construction")

(citation

omitted). 7

7

See also Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1995)
(appellate courts have "no power to rewrite a statute to make it
(continued...)
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III. STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY IS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE AT
COMMON LAW BECAUSE FIRST TITLE'S ACTUAL AUTHORITY WAS LIMITED
TO ISSUING STEWART TITLE INSURANCE POLICIES. FIRST TITLE HAD
NO APPARENT AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT ESCROW, SETTLEMENT OR CLOSING
TRANSACTIONS ON STEWART'S BEHALF.
Plaintiffs

cannot

alternately

assert

that

Stewart

is

vicariously liable for the acts of First Title under a theory that
First Title was Stewart's general agent.

In their Second Amended

Complaint, plaintiffs allege that Stewart is liable under § 31A-23305.

Section 31A-23-305 states in relevant part:
There is a rebuttable presumption that every
insurer is bound by any act of its agent performed
in this state that is within the scope of the
agent's actual (express or implied) or apparent
authority, until the insurer has cancelled the
agent's appointment and has made reasonable efforts
to recover from the agent its policy forms and
other indicia of agency.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-305

(1996).

this provision as a matter of law.
First

Title's

closings

actions

Stewart is not liable under
Since, as demonstrated below,

in performing

escrows,

settlements

and

(presumably the basis of any claim under §31A-23-305)8

7

(...continued)
conform to an intention not expressed") (citation omitted); Utah
State Bar v. Summerhavs & Haden, 905 P.2d 867, 871 (Utah 1995)
("[w]hen construing a statute" a court "must determine the
legislative intent, and the best evidence of legislative intent is
the plain language of the statute") (citations omitted).
8

While plaintiffs do identify as a "wrongdoing" First Title's
issuing a title insurance policy for $1.6 million on the Ranch when
the Ranch's purchase price was $1.8 million, plaintiffs do not
claim to have been damaged by this supposed error nor do plaintiffs
base any of their causes of action on it.
Rather, plaintiffs
appear to claim that First Title's issuing a title insurance policy
on the Ranch for $1.6 million is evidence of George's "kickback
commission."
[Pltfs.' Brief at 10, 11.]
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were not within the scope of First Title's actual or apparent
agency authority, Stewart is not liable as a matter of law under
§31A-23-305 or under a common law agency theory of liability.
The Utah Supreme Court has concluded that at common law "an
agent cannot make its principal responsible for the agent's actions
unless the agent is acting pursuant to either actual or apparent
authority."

Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d

1090, 1094 (Utah 1988) . It is the plaintiffs' burden to prove the
existence of an agency relationship between Stewart and First Title
with

respect

to

the

escrow

transactions

at

issue.

Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 657 S.W.2d 679, 682

Philip

v.

(Mo. Ct. App.

1983); Calabrese Foundation v. Investment Advisors, 831 F.Supp.
1507, 1513

(D. Colo. 1993)

("the party claiming an act was done

within the scope of an agent's authority, has the burden of proving
that authority").

In this case, plaintiffs cannot meet

their

burden of proving that First Title had actual or apparent authority
to act as Stewart's agent with respect to the escrow, settlement or
closing transactions at issue.
Title companies, like First Title, often are involved in two
distinct functions: (i) examining title and issuing title insurance
and (ii) receiving and disbursing money as escrow, settlement, and
closing agents.9

Title insurance underwriters such as Stewart are

9

A title company's escrow, settlement and closing activities
are tightly interwoven and functionally indistinguishable as
demonstrated by the Code's lumping them together in setting out the
requirements that a title insurance agent must meet in order to
(continued...)
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involved in only the first function as underwriters of the title
insurance policies issued by title companies.
Commissioner

treats

title

functions

separately.

function,

a

title

requirements.

and

In

company

escrow,

order
must

to

The Utah Insurance

settlement

perform

fulfill

and

each

closing

categorical

distinct

licensing

See Utah Code. Ann. § 31A-23-211 (4) , (6)

(1996)

(providing for separate licensing of title and escrow, settlement
and closing functions when conducted by title insurance agents).
Thus, a title company like First Title may be licensed to handle
title matters, but not to handle escrows, settlements or closings.
Id.

Conversely,

functions,

but

§§ 7-1-501(7),
regulation

a company may be
not

title

7-22-101,

of

.et

independent

licensed

functions.
seq. ,
escrow

to perform

See

(1996)

Utah

Code

(providing

companies).

escrow

for

Once

Ann.
the
these

distinctions are understood, it is clear that First Title did not
have

agency

authority

from

Stewart

to

conduct

the

escrow,

settlement or closing services at issue in this case.

9

( . ..continued)
perform activities extraneous to the issuing of title insurance
policies. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-211 (4) (1996) ("a title
insurance agent may not perform the functions of escrow, closing,
or settlement, unless the agent has been examined on the fiduciary
duties and procedures involved in those functions"); Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-23-307 (1996) ("[a] title insurance agent may engage in the
escrow, settlement, or closing business . . . and operate as a
escrow, settlement, or closing agent provided that all the
following exist . . . " ; applying the same requirements to each
activity).
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1.
An

First
Title's
Actual
Authority
Issuing Stewart Title Insurance

agent's

actual

authority

Was Limited
Policies.

is governed

by

the

to

relevant

agreement (or agreements) between the principal and agent. Cameron
County Sav. Ass'n v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 819 S.W.2d 600,
602 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (examining agency agreement between title
insurer and purported agent to determine whether agent had actual
authority from title insurer as to issue unrelated to issuance of
insurance) .
In the present

case, there

is a written Agency Agreement

between Stewart and First Title that expressly delineates First
Title's authority.

This agreement empowers First Title to act as

Stewart's agent for the limited purpose of executing title polices.
The Agency Agreement expressly states that First Title may not hold
itself out as Stewart's agent for escrow business.

By contract,

First Title did not have actual authority to act as Stewart's agent
in handling the escrow transactions at issue.
Furthermore, in each transaction where policies or binders of
title insurance were issued, the parties paid First Title a title
insurance

premium

closing fees.

separate

from

any

escrow,

settlement

and/or

Likewise, the Agency Agreement provides that Stewart

is only to be paid a percentage of premiums received by First Title
for issuing title insurance policies, guarantees, and endorsements.
Stewart

does

not

escrow,

settlement

receive

any

or closing

compensation

from

First

Title's

activities.

Consequently,

as a

matter of law, First Title did not have actual authority to conduct
286598 1
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the escrow, settlement or closing activities at issue in this case
as an agent of Stewart.

First Title Did not Have Implied Actual
to Act as Stewart's
Agent in Conducting
Settlement
or Closing
Activities.

2.

Authority
Escrow,

First Title also did not have implied actual authority to act
on Stewart's behalf in conducting escrow, settlement or closing
activities.

Implied actual authority consists of:

[A]uthority to do those acts which are incidental
to, or necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish
or perform, the main authority expressly delegated
to the agent.
Implied authority is actual
authority based upon the premise that whenever
certain business is confided to an agent, such
authority carries with it by implication authority
to do collateral acts which are the natural and
ordinary incidents of the main act or business
authorized.
Zions First Nat'1 Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095
(Utah 1988)

(emphasis added).

First Title could not have had

implied actual authority from Stewart to conduct escrow, closing,
or settlement business since such business was excluded by the
Agency Agreement between Stewart and First Title.

Cameron County

Sav. Ass'n v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. , 819 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1991)

("since

[title insurance

agent] had no express

authority. . . to receive and disburse escrow funds or to close
real estate sales [on title insurance underwriter's] behalf . . .
it could have no implied actual authority to do so") . Furthermore,
there is no evidence that conducting escrow, closing or settlement
business

286598 1
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First

Title's

expressly

delegated task of issuing title insurance policies and commitments
by which Stewart merely guarantees the state of title.
As a matter of law, escrow, settlement or closing functions
cannot be "incidental to, . . . necessary, usual and proper to" the
accomplishment
authority.

of

expressly

delegated

title

See Zions, 762 P. 2d at 1094.

insurance

agency

Utah law requires a

separate license to perform title and escrow, settlement or closing
functions.

A company may be licensed to issue title insurance, but

not to carry out escrows, settlements or closings.

Consequently,

it is impossible that escrow, settlement and closing functions are
"incidental,"

"usual," or

"necessary"

to the

issuing of

title

insurance.

Stewart Did Not Act in a Manner that Would Give
First
Title
Apparent Authority
to Perform
the
Escrow, Settlement
or Closing Services at Issue in
this Case.

3.

In the absence of actual authority, plaintiffs must prove that
First Title had apparent authority to act for Stewart m

handling

the subject escrow, settlement and closing transactions.

To prove

apparent

authority,

plaintiffs

must

show

that

d)

Stewart

manifested its consent to First Title's exercise of authority or
knowingly permitted
plaintiffs
acting

First

Title

"knew of the facts

to assume

the authority;

(n)

[manifestation of authority] and,

in good faith, had reason to believe, and did actually

believe,

that

plaintiffs,

the

agent

possessed

such

authority,"

and

"relying on such appearance of authority,"

(m)

changed

their position and "will be injured or suffer loss if the act done
286598 1
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or transaction executed by" First Title does not bind Stewart.
Luddinaton

v.

Bodenvest

(citation omitted).

Ltd.,

855

P.2d

204, 209

(Utah

See

1993)

Plaintiffs cannot meet these requirements as

a matter of law.
Apparent authority requires "'conduct of the principal which,
reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the
principal consents to have the act done on his [or her] behalf by
the person purporting to act for him

[or her] . ' " Luddinaton v.

Bodenvest Ltd., 855 P.2d 204, 209 (Utah 1993) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Agency

§ 27

(1977)).

In other words, "an agent's

apparent authority flows only from the acts and conduct of the
principal."
1090, 1095

Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P. 2d
(Utah 1988).

"Apparent authority is not

simply 'because it looks so to the person with whom
deals.'"
Plymouth,

Id.
672

(quoting
P.2d

City

89,

90

Electric
(Utah

v.

Dean

1983)).

'apparent'
[the] agent

Evans

Chrysler-

Consequently,

an

individual or entity "who deals exclusively with an agent has the
responsibility

to ascertain that agent's authority despite the

agent's representations."
Plaintiffs

Id.

contend that Stewart's name appearing on First

Title's letterhead, settlement statement forms, and title insurance
policy

forms,

Stewart's

name

irrelevant

to

all

create

appeared
the

issue

apparent
on

title

of

whether

authority.
insurance
First

The
policy

Title

had

fact
forms

that
is

apparent

authority to conduct escrow, settlement or closing activities under
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the guise of being Stewart's agent.

Southwest Title Ins. Co. v.

Northland Bldcr. Corp. , 552 S.W.2d 425, 428

(Tex. 1977)

(title

insurer's "approved agent's . . . possession of blank title policy
form could bear only upon the authority to issue the title policy"
and agent had no apparent authority in regard to "the closing of
the entire transaction" between plaintiff and a third party).
Furthermore, even assuming that Stewart knew that its name
appeared on settlement statements and on First Title's letterhead,
and

even

if

plaintiffs

knew

that

Stewart

was

First

Title's

underwriter, plaintiffs admit that Stewart made no representations
of

any

kind

to

them.

Consequently,

there

is

no

basis

for

plaintiffs' claim that First Title had apparent authority to act as
Stewart's

agent

activities.

in

conducting

escrow,

settlement

or

closing

As demonstrated above, apparent authority requires

"'conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes
the third person to believe that the principal consents to have the
act done on his [or her] behalf by the person purporting to act for
[him or her].'"
(Utah

1993)

Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd., 855 P.2d 204, 209

(emphasis

Agency § 27 (1977)).

added)

(quoting

Restatement

(Second)

of

" [A] n agent's apparent authority flows only

from the acts and conduct of the principal. "

Zions First Nat'l

Bank

1095

v.

Clark

Clinic

(emphasis added).

Corp.,

762

P.2d

1090,

(Utah

1988)

Thus, where a principal furnished its agent a

rubber stamp bearing the principal's name and address, the agent
was not

286598 1
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authority

to endorse

corporate

checks and receive payment for them" since "whatever appearance of
authority the stamp created arose from the actions of [the agent]
himself

and not

[the principal] . "

Pargas, Inc. v. Estate of

Taylor, 416 So.2d 1358, 1362 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Phoenix Western
Holding Corp. v. Gleeson, 500 P.2d 320, 236 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)
(apparent agency authority "must be proved by other evidence before
his [or her] (the agent's) acts and statements can be shown against
the principal" and this "rule applies equally to oral statements of
the

agent

and

the

written

statements,

contained

in

letters,

letterheads, receipts, or other documents implying, admitting, or
claiming authority to act as agent")
omitted).10

Likewise,

in the

(emphasis added)

instant

(citations

case, any appearance

of

authority of First Title to act as an escrow, settlement or closing

10

See also Boules v. Morrison, 503 So. 2d 1, 4, 3 (La. 1987)
(electronics store not liable for agent's taking customer's money
and failing to deliver purchased merchandise even though agent was
hired to solicit business at store and had business cards and blank
sales receipts of store where plaintiffs "failed to prove that
[store management] manifested apparent authority for [agent] to act
as the store's agent"); Smith v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 498 So.
2d 448, 449.50 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986) (agent's possession of blank
insurance application forms from alleged principal did not give
agent apparent authority "to bind" principal thereby compelling
coverage for plaintiff despite representations by agent that
coverage existed); CNA Ins. Co. v. Nutone Corp., 461 So. 2d 518,
521-22 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (construction electrician designated as
"Authorized Nutone Service Center" by decal on service truck did
not act with apparent authority in installing Nutone security
system where service agreement between electrician and Nutone
authorized electrician to only perform m-warranty repair work and
not installation, Nutone provided a toll-free telephone number for
installation and sales of its security system, Nutone received no
proceeds from electrician's installation and "there was no
manifestation made by Nutone which would lead the [plaintiffs] to
believe that [electrician] had the authority to install their
Nutone system").
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agent of Stewart by the appearance of Stewart's name on settlement
statements and First Title's letterhead was the result of First
Title's

conduct,

not

Stewart's.

Stewart

has

made

no

representations to plaintiffs causing plaintiffs to believe First
Title had authority to act as Stewart's escrow, settlement
closing agent.

or

Consequently, as a matter of law, First Title did

not have apparent authority to act as Stewart's agent for escrow,
settlement or closing purposes.

See

Smith v. American Auto Ins.,

498 So. 2d 448, 450 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986) (" [w]here there has been
no representation [of agency authority by alleged principal] there
can

be

no

reliance"

sufficient

to

create

apparent

agency

authority).
Furthermore, there is no evidence that plaintiffs made any
inquiries to First Title or Stewart regarding the extent and scope
of First Title's authority to act as Stewart's agent.

In fact,

plaintiffs admit they never communicated at all with anyone from
Stewart Title Guaranty Company regarding any of the transactions at
issue. As indicated above, since plaintiffs dealt exclusively with
First Title and not Stewart in relation to the transactions at
issue in this case, plaintiffs were obligated to ascertain the
nature and extent of First Title's authority regardless of any
representations made to plaintiffs by First Title.

Zions, 762 P. 2d

at 1095; see also Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982)
("[t]he general rule is that one who deals with an agent has the
responsibility

286598 1
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agent's

authority

despite

the

agent's representations"). Plaintiffs made no attempt to determine
the nature or extent of First Title's authority to act as Stewart's
agent

and,

therefore, plaintiffs

cannot

now attempt

to impose

vicarious liability on Stewart for First Title's alleged misconduct
in conducting the escrow activities at issue under either § 31A-233 05 or on the basis of a common law agency theory of liability.
See Dohrman Hotel Supply Co. v. Beau Brummel, 103 P.2d 650 (Utah
1940)

(defendant

company

was

not

entitled

to

act

"upon

the

assumption" that agent with limited authority had authority to
settle dispute pursuant to agent's representations where defendant
did not meet "its burden to determine just how great the agency
conferred w a s " ) . n

11

See also Byles Welding & Tractor, Inc. v. McDaniel, 441 So.
2d 48, 50 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (alleged principal is not liable for
charges made by agent on principal's open account at equipment
supply company where plaintiff failed to meet its duty "to inquire
into the nature and extent of powers of" agent since alleged
principal "should not be punished" for plaintiff's "lax business
practices"); Network Management Services Group, Inc. v. Rosen
Krantz Lyon & Ross, Inc., 211 A.2d 584, 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
("plaintiff, which failed to make the necessary efforts to discover
the actual authority" of agent "acted at its own peril in assuming
that [agent] had authority to act" with alleged apparent authority;
plaintiff's "speculation that some evidence of" agent's alleged
[apparent] authority may come to light during discovery is
insufficient to bar summary judgment" in alleged principal's
favor) . Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Lea, 775 F.Supp. 921, 928
(E.D. La. 1991) (summary judgment in favor of insurance company on
grounds of lack of apparent authority of agent where insured "made
no inquiry whatsoever into the nature and extent of [agent's]
authority" since "a party seeking to benefit from the doctrine of
apparent authority may not blindly rely upon the assertions of the
agent. Rather, he [or she] has a duty to inquire into the nature
and extent of the agent's power"); Hausam v. Schnasb, 887 P.2d
1076, 1080 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (summary judgment in favor of
principal on grounds of lack of apparent authority of agent to bind
(continued...)
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Finally, there is no evidence that plaintiffs relied on First
Title's alleged manifestation of authority in deciding to pursue
the transactions at issue in this case.

Plaintiffs have made no

allegations, and there is no evidence indicating, that plaintiffs
would not have engaged First Title to execute the various escrows
or closings if they had known that First Title was not acting as
Stewart's

agent

in performing

these

issuing title insurance policies.

functions,

as

opposed

to

Consequently, plaintiffs cannot

meet the required element of reliance in arguing that First Title
had apparent authority to act as Stewart's escrow, settlement or
closing agent.
1986)

See Nappen v. Blanchard, 510 A.2d 324, 329 (N.J.

(where plaintiffs are merely aware of "approved attorney"

letter issued to title insurance agent and "at no time have the
plaintiffs claimed that they relied on the
letter when they entrusted

'approved attorney'

[agent] with their funds

. . . the

necessary element of reliance on the alleged apparent authority" is
lacking; summary judgment in title insurer's favor on the grounds
of lack of agency authority) .12

11

( . . .continued)
principal on promissory note for repayment where plaintiff "lent
[money] to an entity about which he knew or discovered nothing"
since a party seeking to hold a principal liable for acts of an
agent within the scope of the agent's apparent authority must "use
reasonable diligence to ascertain the agent's authority" which
"encompasses a duty to inquire with the principal about the agent's
authority").
12

See also Iowa Nat. Mut. Inc. Co. v. Backens, 186 N.W.2d 196,
200-20, (Wis. 1971) (plaintiff did not rely on indices of apparent
authority of service station to "recap" tires as an authorized
(continued. . . )
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The Texas Court of Appeals was recently faced with a title
insurance agency case with facts very similar to those in the
instant case.

In Cameron County Sav. Ass'n v. Stewart Guaranty

Co., 819 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), the plaintiff lent money
to a buyer to purchase condominiums.

The closing documents showed

that the buyer paid the balance, plus closing costs, in cash when
in fact the buyer paid no cash, so that only the plaintiff funded
the sale.

The plaintiff contended that the title insurance agent,

who also conducted the escrow on the transaction, manipulated the
closing to conceal the buyer's lack of down payment, and that had
the plaintiff known of the lack of down payment, it would not have
made the loan.

The plaintiff then brought suit against the title

insurer when the buyer defaulted on the loan.
In upholding summary judgment in the title insurer's favor on
the basis that the agency relationship was limited to issuing title
insurance and did not extend to escrows and closings, the Texas
Court of Appeals noted

that

(1) the relevant agency

documents

limited the title insurance agent's authority to issuing
policies,

title

(2) the title insurer never held the title insurance

12

( . . . continued)
recapping agent of tire manufacturer where plaintiff testified he
had tires recapped at service station merely because "it was
convenient" and service station owner "was a friend"; judgment in
favor of manufacturer on grounds of lack of apparent authority
upheld) ; Hunter Mining Lab, v. Management Assistance, 763 P. 2d 350,
352-53 (Nev. 1988) (judgment notwithstanding jury verdict in
defendant's favor on grounds that agent lacked apparent authority
to act on defendant's behalf upheld where "the record reveals that
[plaintiff] did not rely on any . . . representations of agency [by
defendant] when entering into its contracts with" agent).
286598 1

33

agent out to the public as reliable or trustworthy in the closing
of real estate transactions, (3) the title insurance agent had no
authority

to act

on

the

title

insurer's

behalf

in

conducting

escrows and closings, (4) the title insurer conducted no business
except title insurance, and (5) the title insurer received only a
title

insurance

premium

from

Likewise, in the instant case

the

insured.

Id.

at

603-04.

(1) the Amended Agency Agreement

between First Title and Stewart limited First Title's authority to
issuing title policies, (2) Stewart never held out First Title as
its agent to conduct escrow activities,

(3) the Amended Agency

Agreement expressly states that First Title will have no authority
to act on Stewart's behalf

in conducting First Title's

escrow

activities, (4) Stewart engages only in the title insurance, and
not the escrow business, and

(5) Stewart received only a title

insurance premium from the plaintiffs.

[Arlen B. Taylor Aff . at HH

5,6,7 and Exhibit A, H 11, R. 283.]
CONCLUSION
This case concerns disputes between the plaintiffs and their
real estate development partner, Vernon George.

In a nutshell,

plaintiffs claim they were defrauded by George, and that Stewart's
title insurance agent, First Title, should have warned plaintiffs
of the fraud.

Stewart's only involvement in these transactions was

as the title insurer whose policies were issued by First Title in
the transactions at issue in this case.
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A careful review of the statutes argued by plaintiffs to
impose vicarious liability on Stewart reveals that there is no
basis for any claims against Stewart.

Section 31A-23-308 of the

Utah Code imposes liability on title companies for the receipt and
disbursement of funds deposited in escrows, settlements or closings
with their title insurance agents.
and

there

is no

evidence,

that

Plaintiffs have not alleged,
First

Title

engaged

in any

misconduct in receiving or disbursing funds deposited with it in
any of the escrow, settlement or closing transactions at issue in
this case.
Section

31A-23-305

of

the Utah Code purports

to "bind"

insurance companies for the acts of their agents occurring within
the scope of the agent's actual or apparent authority. Plaintiffs'
claims against Stewart for vicarious liability under this provision
arise out of First Title's conduct in certain escrow, settlement
and closing transactions.

First Title's actual authority was

limited by contract, however, to issuing Stewart title insurance
policies.

Furthermore, First Title had no apparent authority to

engage in escrows, settlements or closings on behalf of Stewart.
Consequently, Stewart cannot be held vicariously liable under §
31A-23-305, or at common law, as a matter of law. Stewart submits,
therefore, that the Court should uphold the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in Stewart's favor.
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3> I
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SEAN ^AT^MONSON
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Stewart Title Guaranty Company
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Tabl

31A-23-305. Insurer liability.
(1) There is a rebuttable presumption that every insurer is bound by any act
of its agent performed in this state that is within the scope of the agent's actual
(express or implied) or apparent authority, until the insurer has cancelled the
agent*s appointment and has made reasonable efforts to recoverfromthe agent
its policy forms and other indicia of agency. Reasonable efforts include a formal
demand in writing for return of the indicia, and notice to the commissioner if
the agent does not promptly comply with the demand. This subsection neither
waives any common law defense available to insurers, nor precludes the
insuredfromseeking redress against the agent individually or jointly against
the insurer and agent.
(2) When a property/liability insurance agent with authority to bind more
than one insurer on a particular risk agrees to bind coverage on a particular
risk, but fails to outwardly indicate the insurer with which the risk is placed,
and before the risk is placed with a particular insurer a loss occurs, if there is
no conclusive admissible evidence indicating the insurer with which the agent
exercised his binding authority, a court may equitably apportion the loss
among all insurers with which the agent had binding authority as to the
particular type of risk.
History: C. 1953, 31A-23-305, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 28; 1986, ch. 204, § 200.

Cross-References.—Presumptions, U.RE.
301.

31A-23-308. Liability of title insurers for acts of title
insurance agents.
Any title company, represented by one or more title insurance agents, is
directly and primarily liable to others dealing with the title insurance agents
for the receipt and disbursement of funds deposited in escrows, closings, or
settlements with the title insurance agents in all those transactions where a
commitment or binder for or policy or contract of title insurance of that title
insurance company has been ordered, or a preliminary report of the title
insurance company has been issued or distributed. This liability does not
modify, mitigate, impair, or affect the contractual obligations between the title
insurance agents and the title insurance company.
History: C. 1953, 31A-23-308, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 28.

